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States' Powerful New Shield to Guard
Water Resources: PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology
W. BLAINE EARLY, III*

PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology' allows a state, under authority of the Clean Water Act,'
to require the minimum stream flow needed to support a body of
water's designated use as a condition for granting certification for a
hydroelectric plant.3 The Court interpreted section 401 of the Clean
Water Act 4 broadly, allowing the state to "condition certification
upon any limitations necessary to ensure compliance with state
water quality standards .... ..
The decision in PUD No. I has far-reaching effects on state
control of water quality. First is its obvious impact on development
of new hydroelectric projects. Second is the decision's impact on
relicensing of existing hydroelectric facilities because "[b]oth Congress and the courts have decreed that in relicensing proceedings
[the licensing agency] must reconsider project operations according
to today's values and regulatory requirements." 6 Third, and perhaps
most significant, is the impact on the various "federal licenses and

. Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law; J.D., Class
of 1996, University of Kentucky; Ph.D., University of Louisville; B.A., DePauw University.
PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 114 S.
Ct. 1900 (1994) [hereinafter PUD No. I].
2 The Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 and Supp. V. 1993).
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
33 U.S.C. § 1341.
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1910.
6 Michael C. Blumm, Federalism, Hydroelectric Licensing and the Future of Minimum Streamflows after California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 21 ENVrL.

L. 113, 114-15 (1991)

[hereinafter Blumm] (citations omitted).
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permits for activities which may result in a discharge into the
Nation's navigable waters." 7 This decision "gives states water quality control over a wide range of activities for which they otherwise
might lack such authority."8
At issue in PUD. No. I was a proposed hydroelectric plant on
the Dosewallips River in Washington state.' PUD No. I of Jefferson County and the City of Tacoma planned a new hydroelectric
facility on the pristine and undeveloped Dosewallips River just outside Olympic National Park.'0 "Washington's water quality standards classify the Dosewallips River as Class AA (extraordinary).
The characteristic uses of Class AA waters include salmonid and
other fish 'migration, rearing, [and] spawning."'' ' The plan was to
construct a dam on the river and channel about 75 percent of the
water into a tunnel along the river.' The diverted water would be
used to turn turbines to generate electricity and then would be returned to the river about 1.2 miles downstream. 3 The parties
sought to determine the minimum stream flow in the 1.2 mile section that would be necessary to preserve native fish populations. 4
The Jefferson County Public Utility District 1 and the City of Tacoma challenged the condition but the Washington Supreme Court upheld the restriction and stated that "setting the streamflow requirement 5was within [the Washington Department of] Ecology's author,
ity.'
The United States Supreme Court, affirming the Washington
court's decision, relied on the state's right to establish water quality
standards pursuant to section 303 of the Clean Water Act 6 which
may include section 303's "antidegradation policy."' 7 The Court
then interpreted section 401 of the Clean Water Act" to allow the
state to require adherence to the broad water quality standards as a
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
ROBERT W.

ADLER ET

AL., THE

CLEAN WATER

ACT: TwENTY

YEARS LATER

203 (1993).
9 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1907.
Respondents' Brief at 1, 1993 WL 632337, PUD. No. 1.
Id. at 2, 3 (citations omitted).
Id. at 3, 4.
id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
S State Department of Ecology v. PUD No. I of Jefferson County, 849 P.2d 646,
648 (Wash. 1993).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washingotn Department of Ecology, 114 S.
Ct. 1900, 1905-07 (1994) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B)).
33 U.S.C. § 1341.
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condition for granting a permit. 9
The petitioners' claims of error can be organized into three
categories: first, that water quality is properly determined only by
specific numerical criteria;2" second, that water quantity is not an
appropriate standard on which to base regulation;2 and third, that
allowing the state to impose minimum flow rates interferes with the
powers of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under the
Federal Power Act.2
This comment looks first at the purposes of the Clean Water
Act and how it established complementary roles for state and federal
government. Part II discusses water quality limitations on certification of hydroelectric projects. Part III examines section 401 and
section 303 of the Clean Water Act. Parts IV through VI analyze
the Court's treatment of the petitioners' arguments.
I.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE
STATES

From its origin in 1972, the objective of the Clean Water Act
was to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation's Waters."23 The inclusion of both "restore"
and "maintain" is significant because the Clean Water Act requires
"not only that we repair damaged waters, but that we actively protect those waters that so far have escaped the impacts of past pollution, that is, that we keep clean waters clean.

'24

As stepping stones

to its overall objective, Congress also proposed to eliminate the
discharge of pollutants,25 prohibit the discharge of toxic pollutants
in toxic amounts,26 and promote water quality that is conducive to
fish and wildlife.27
The federal and state governments have different roles in implementing the strategies to meet the goals of the Clean Water Act.
Under the Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency is required, among other things, to establish and enforce

'9 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1907.
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1910-12.
2 Id. at 1912, 1913.
2
Id. at 1914.
2
24

33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a).
ADLER Er AL., supra note 8, at 7 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8.

26

Id.

2

Id. (this goal is referred to as "fishable swimmable waters").
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technology-based limitations on individual discharges into the
country's navigable waters from point sources. Section 303 of the
Act also requires each State, subject to federal approval, to institute comprehensive water quality standards establishing water
quality goals for all intrastate waters.28
The complementary roles of the federal and state governments have come
into conflict.29 In resolving the conflict, the Court has decided that the
federal Clean Water Act preempts state law.' Federal preemption is especially troublesome in the development of hydroelectric facilities, which are
licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, but are certified
according to state standards of water quality.3"
II.

WATER QUALITY AND CERTIFICATION OF HYDROELECTRIC

PROJECTS
"Section 4(e) of the [Federal Power Act] empowers [the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)] to issue licenses for projects
'necessary or convenient.., for the development, transmission, and
utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams ... over
which Congress has jurisdiction."' 32 Projects that involve these federal
licenses may also be required to secure state certification regarding effects
on water quality.3" Tests of the powers of states to limit certification of
hydroelectric projects according to state-formulated standards of water
quality have yielded mixed results.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
''
to PUD No. I "to resolve [these conflicts] among the state courts of last resort.
In Power Authority of New York the New York Court of Appeals

2' PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1905 (citations omitted).
29 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of water quality standards takes precedence over
a state's interpretation).
30 WILUAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 287 (2d ed. 1994); Neil
Fairweather, Arkansas v. Oklahoma: Downstream States Left Without a Paddle 9 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 189 (1993-94).
" See generally Lisa M. Bogardus, State Certification of Hydroelectric Facilities
Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 12 Va. ENVTL. L.J. 43 (1992) [hereinafter
Bogardus] (discussing the issues of section 401 certification that are involved in PUD
No. 1); Andrew H. Sawyer, Rock Creek Revisited: State Water Quality Certification of
Hydroelectric Projects in California, 25 PAc. L. 973 (1994) (discussing the issues of
section 401 certification that are involved in PUD No. 1).
" California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 495 U.S. 494, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 3304 (1990) (citations omitted) (hereinafter California v. FERC).
"' See Part III, infra.
3, Power Authority of New York v. Williams, 457 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1983); State
Department of Ecology v. PUD No. I of Jefferson County, 849 P.2d 646 (1993).
" PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1908.
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adopted a narrow interpretation of the section 401 certification process
saying, "[the state] is limited to determining whether applicable water
quality standards will be met and is not empowered to base [its] decision
on a balancing of need for the project against adverse environmental impact."' New York had adopted a state-wide energy policy distinct from
any water quality standards.3 7 All state agencies were supposed to take
this energy policy into consideration in the discharge of their duties.38
New York's Commissioner of Environmental Conservation had denied
section 401 certification for a hydroelectric project because the power
authority "had failed to demonstrate that the relevant water quality standards would be met."39 The court below rejected the limitation of considering only water quality and found that this state energy law should be
considered in granting the certification.' The Power Authority of New
York court reversed the court below, stating that to allow the state to issue
a section 401 certification "despite noncompliance with water quality standards on the basis of overriding energy needs" would run counter to the
role assigned to the state by the Clean Water Act." Although the decision
denied consideration of the energy policy in evaluating certification, in a
footnote the court remarked that other factors related to the "classification
of State waters" could be considered. 42 This reference to the classification
of waters is a prelude to the situation in PUD No. 1.
In contrast with the restrictive view of the Power Authority court, the
Washington Supreme Court in State Department of Ecology adopted a
broad interpretation of section 401 and permitted the state to consider other
factors in addition to the state water quality standards when issuing certification. 43 The court noted that the phrase in section 401(d), "any other
appropriate requirement of State law," is "a congressional authorization to
the states to consider all state action related to water quality in imposing
conditions on section 401 certificates.""4 It is unclear from the
Washington court's analysis ' whether it would have allowed consideration of a New York-like energy policy that is not specifically related to
water quality. The Court's next task in this area may be to establish the
outer boundaries of what may be considered in section 401 certification.

• Power Authority, 457 N.E.2d at 727.
I at 728.
Id.
38 id.
'
41

Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.

" Power Authority, 457 N.E.2d at 730.
42 Id. at 730-31, n.3.
State Dept of Ecology v. PUD No. I of Jefferson County, 849 P.2d 646, 653
(Wash. 1993).
Id. at 653.
' Id. at 651-53.
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303 AND SECTION 401 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

AND STATE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

Section 303

A.

Section 303 of the Clean Water Act' addresses state water quality
standards and their formulation. New or revised standards must be presented to the federal government for approval and must include the designated uses of the water and the water qua-lity criteria for the water.' Part
IV discusses the significance of "designated uses" and "water quality criteria."

Section 401

B.

Section 401(a) of the Clean Water Act provides that under certain
circumstances, applicants for a federal license or permit must obtain certification from the state.' This section "only applies to a project when
that project results in a discharge."'49 Section 401(d) lists the sources of
limitations that may be placed on an applicant for a federal license or permit."° The petitioners in PUD No. I conceded that there would be a discharge from the proposed plant and that a section 401 certification was
necessary. 5' At issue was whether the state "may only impose water quality limitations specifically tied to a 'discharge.""'5 The Court interpreted

33 U.S.C. § 1313.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
This section provides:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities,
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which
the discharge originates or will originate . . . that any such discharge will
comply with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316,
and 1317 of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
at 51.
'9 Bogardus, supra note 31,
This section provides:
Any certification provided under this section shall set forth any
effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will
comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations under
section 1311 or 1312 of this title . . . and with any other appropriate
requirement of State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a
condition on any Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this
section.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
s' PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1908.
IId. at 1909.
4-

4
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section 401(a)(1) to identify which projects require certification -- those
that produce a discharge. 3
Because section 401(d) contains the language "to assure that any
applicant for a federal license," the Court held that compliance referred to
the applicant and not just the discharge.54 Section 401(d), then, "[authorizes] additional conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole."55 The
power of states to place these "additional conditions and limitations" is
limited by section 401(d) to those allowed under Title 33, sections 1311
and 1312, other provisions of the Clean Water Act, and "any other appropriate requirement of State law."56 The Court refrained from considering
what "additional state laws" might apply.5" It did, however, note that "at a
minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality standards
adopted pursuant to section 303 are 'appropriate' requirements of state
law.""8 Here the Court left unanswered the question noted in considering
Power Authority of New York.59
Thus, at a minimum, the state may use section 303 standards to determine conditions for granting a section 401 certification. The Court allowed
this even though "section 303 is not one of the statutory provisions listed
in section 401(d), [because] the statute allows states to impose limitations
to ensure compliance with ... Title 33, section 1311. [Which] in turn incorporates section 303 by reference." ' This action by the Court gives
states enormous latitude to develop water quality standards upon which
they can condition granting certification.
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS ARE MORE THAN MERE

IV.

SPECIFIC WATER QUALITY CRITERIA

If states can include section 303 criteria in a section 401 certification,
what may be considered under section 303? The petitioners argued:
[Tihat § 303 requires the State to protect designated uses solely
through implementation of specific [numerical] 'criteria' . . . , that
use requirements are too open-ended, and that the Act only contemplates enforcement of the more specific and objective
'criteria' . . , [and] that enforcement of water quality standards
through use designations renders the water quality criteria component of the standards irrelevant.6

53

Id.

S4 id.
55

Id.

PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1909.
57

id.

6'

Id. at 1910.
See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1909.

61

Id. at 1910-11.

'9
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These three arguments focus on the petitioners' desire to be
bound by numerical water quality criteria instead of the broader
requirements that stem from supporting a water's designated use.
Section 303(c)(2)(A) states:
Whenever the State revises or adopts a new standard, such revised
or new standard shall be submitted to the Administrator. Such
revised or new water quality standard shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality
criteria for such waters based upon such uses. Such standards
shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance
the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such
standards shall be established taking into consideration their use
and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other
purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value
for navigation."
The Court, focusing on the second sentence of this statute, held that
both the designated use and the water quality criteria make up the
water quality standard.63 To bolster this interpretation, the Court
referred to EPA regulations that "recognize that in some circumstances, criteria alone are insufficient to protect a designated use."
The limited ability of mere chemical water quality criteria to protect
bodies of water has also been noted by commentators. 65 Water
quality criteria, although they arguably do not provide adequate
protection for all bodies of water, are generally objectively measurable.' Armed with numerical criteria, a project designer could predict possible problem areas and anticipate solutions. However, how
can a project designer consider the expansive requirements of a
designated use?
The petitioners' next challenge concerned this "open-ended"
nature of the designated use. 67 The Court countered this argument,
noting that only for "toxic pollutants listed pursuant to section
1317(a)(1)" must numerical criteria be given 6' and concluded that

62
63

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1910.

, Id. at 1911.
65 See, e.g., ADLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 205; Sawyer, supra note 31, at 1001.
67

Rogers, supra note 30, at 345-46.
PUD No. I, 114 S. Ct. at 1911.

PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, i14 S.
Ct. 1900, 1911 (1994) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B)); 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b)(2)
(1992)).
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"the Act permits enforcement of broad, narrative criteria ... ,69
This treatment is consistent with the EPA's regulations.7"
The final challenge along this line was the assertion that "enforcement of water quality standards through use designations renders the water quality criteria component of the standards irrelevant."'" In its answer to this challenge the Court gave a telling description of its view of the relationship of criteria and uses:
While enforcement of criteria will in general protect the uses of
these diverse waters, a complementary requirement that activities
also comport with designated uses enables the States to ensure
that each activity - even if not foreseen by the criteria - will be
consistent with the specific uses and attributes of a particular body
of water.7"
Thus, the Court has given states a flexible and powerful shield for
its water resources. This flexibility is especially important in situations in which it may be difficult to predict or monitor specific
criteria but where management to support a designated use is practicable.73 It is not necessary for a state to formulate "criteria...
sufficiently detailed and individualized to fully protect the water's
designated uses."74 The Court's position suggests that when a state
has developed water quality standards which include both criteria
and designated uses, pursuant to section 303(c)(2)(A),7" the state
may evaluate a proposed activity according to its impact on the
designated use of the water, even though specific numerical criteria
have not been formulated to address the particular impact.
Almost parenthetically the Court addressed the question of
water quality standards and the "antidegradation policy" required by
69

Id.

70

EPA's regulations reflect Congress' definition of water quality standards in 33 U.S.C. § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). They provide that "[a] water quality standard defines the water quality goals of a
water body, or portion thereof, by designating the use or uses to be made
of the water and by setting criteria necessary to protect the uses." 40
C.F.R. § 131.2 (1994). EPA defines "criteria" as "elements of State water

quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular

use." 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (1994).
Petitioner's Brief at 9, 1993 WL 632338, PUD No. 1.
" PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1911.
72
"

id.
See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 31, at 1006.

7' PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1912.

, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
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section 303.76 The Supreme Court of Washington had noted that
Washington had formulated its water quality standards with the
condition that "existing beneficial uses shall be maintained and
protected and no further degradation which would interfere with or
become injurious to existing beneficial uses will be allowed."" The
Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the antidegradation policy,
cited Environmental Protection Agency regulations, and concluded
that Washington's policy "ensures that an 'existing water us[e]' will
be 'maintained and protected."'' T
Perhaps the Court in this decision is manifesting evolutive
considerations in statutory interpretation.79 The goals of the Clean
Water Act were ambitious and aimed at broad ecosystem integrity.80 The meager success that the Act has achieved is often "with
respect to the conventional pollution indicators (dissolved oxygen,
bacteria, suspended solids, dissolved solids and phosphorus) ...
"8 However, these indicators of water quality "are only surrogate
indicators of ecosystem health."82 The "disturbing reality is that we
have not succeeded in maintaining the biological productivity of our
surface waters .. ..""The Court may be responding to the changing thoughts about water quality management. It noted that its interpretation of these statutes is consistent with the relevant regulations
of Environmental Protection Agency. 4 Sensing the limited success
of criteria-dependent controls, the Court may be willing to interpret
the statutes in a broader manner to achieve Congress' goals.

76

PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1912 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(b)).

, State, Department of Ecology v. PUD No. I of Jefferson County, 849 P.2d 646,
650 (citing WAC 173-201-035(8)(a)).
7
PUD No. 1, 114 S.Ct. at 1912 (citing 40 CFR § 131.12(a)(1) (1992)).
71 William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 359 (1990) ("The enactment of a statute is often
the beginning of a significant process of implementation by courts or agencies. Implementation changes the statute, because the statute must be applied - and often subtly
redirected - to meet variations of the problem not originally anticipated.").
a See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
Rodgers, supra note 30, at 264.
'2 ADLER Er AL., supra note 8, at 28.
'3 Rodgers, supra note 30, at 270.
'4 PUD No. 1, 114 S. CL at 1909.
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WATER QUANTITY IS AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD ON
WHICH TO BASE REGULATION

The petitioners claimed "that the Clean Water Act is only concerned with water 'quality,' and does not allow the regulation of
water 'quantity."' 85 In response, the Court noted that "[i]n many
cases, water quantity is closely related to water quality.... "86 The
Court supported its position with three lines of evidence: the Clean
Water Act's definition of pollution,87 Environmental Protection
Agency regulations,88 and other provisions of the Clean Water
Act.89 The Court's interpretation of "pollution" is particularly important.
The Clean Water Act defines pollution as "the man-made or
man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and
radiological integrity of water."9 This definition "suggest[s] impacts far broader than the release of chemical pollutants from sewers
and factories."9'1 Instead, it focuses on almost any alteration of the
water that results in "bad effects."9'2 In adopting a broad interpretation of pollution so as to include man-made changes such as reduced water flow, the Court noted "Congress' concern with the
physical and biological integrity of water . . . ."9' Lower courts
have held that "states may use section 401 only to address chemical
impairment. .. .9 With the decision in PUD No. I of Jefferson
County, the United States Supreme Court has declared that narrow
approach incorrect.

"
86

Id. at 1912.
Id.

"7 Pollution is "the man-made or man induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, and radiological integrity of water." Id. at 1913 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19)).
Id. at 1913 (citing EPA regulations 40 CFR § 131.10(g)(4)).
Id. at 1913 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) and 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2)).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(19).
9' ADLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 9.
Rodgers, supra note 30, at 301.
9 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1913.
94 ADLER Er AL., supra note 8, at 205.
'9
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ALLOWING THE STATE TO IMPOSE MINIMUM FLow RATES

Is CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL POWERS UNDER FERC AND FPA

The petitioners maintained that Washington did not have the
authority to impose minimum flow requirements because the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is vested with authority to
license hydroelectric plants.95 In California v. FERC," the Court
denied states the ability to impose stream flow restrictions on hydroelectric plants. "The Court... held that the Federal Power Act
(FPA) preempts state regulatory water laws as applied to hydroelectric power projects licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)."97 The California v. FERC decision seems to support the petitioners' argument. Justice Thomas agreed, saying
"[t]oday, the Court gives the States precisely the veto power over
hydroelectric projects that we determined in California v. FERC and
First Iowa they did not possess. '
Commentators foreshadowed the Court's decision in PUD No.
1. One noted that the California v. FERC Court "rested its decision
on the principle of stare decisis .... [T]he decision provides little

guidance in predicting how the Court will decide future cases involving conflicts between federal and state regulatory authority.""
Another cautioned that "states are not powerless to secure [minimum stream] flows from FERC-licensed projects. States may insist
on flows necessary to meet water quality requirements [under section 3 03].j""

The PUD No. I Court found two reasons to support
Washington's requirement in the face of FERC licensing. First, there
was not yet, if ever, a conflict with FERC over stream flows. At the
time of the suit FERC had not acted on the license application and
there was federal agreement with the stream flow requirements.'0 '
The Court gave no hint about what the result would be if there was
a conflict. Nor did the Court address what the result would be in the

PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 110 S. Ct. 2024, reh'g
denied, 110 S.Ct. 3304 (1990). (This decision was guided by the Court's prior decision
in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 66 S. Ct. 906 (1946)).
" Roderick E. Walston, California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: New
Roadblock to State Water Rights Administration, 21 Envtl. L. 89, 90 (1991).
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1920 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
Walston, supra note 97, at 91.
" Blumm, supra note 6, at 128.
"'
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
'9

"
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case of a relicensing. This latter situation will likely present many
such problems in the near future."0 2
Second, the Court stated that "the requirement for a state certification applies not only to applications for licenses from FERC, but
to all federal licenses and permits for activities which may result in
a discharge into the Nation's navigable waters."'' 3 Thus, even if
the broad water quality standards under section 303 and state certification under section 401 for hydroelectric projects eventually fall
under federal preemption by FERC, the water quality standards
would still be applicable under a variety of other federal projects
that require licenses or permits.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps due to confusion about which criteria may be applied
in a section 401 certification or because the water quality certification can be waived, states have made limited use of their power to
restrict federal licensing or permitting projects that affect water quality. 4 This situation may soon change. The Court's acceptance of
broad, ecosystem-oriented definitions of water quality standards; its
willingness to allow states to use laws in addition to the federally
accepted water quality standards; and its endorsement of the
antidegradation policy all combine to give states a complex and
flexible shield to protect their waters via section 401 certification of
federal projects. However, because the Court stopped short of indicating which types of state guidelines outside of those promulgated according to section 303 would be acceptable, the shield will
work best if the states formulate water quality standards based on
appropriate designated uses. Furthermore, the states must exert their
right to require certification of projects. A condition placed by the
state on a certification pursuant to section 401(d) becomes a condition of the federal license or permit. 5 This power extends beyond
the realm of hydroelectric plants to all projects for which section
401 certification is appropriate. Thus, states can exercise broad
control over the impact that these projects have on state waters.

"0

See generally Sawyer, supra note 31.
PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
ADLER E7 AL., supra note 8, at 203.

'0'

PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct at 1920 (dissent, citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(d)); ADLER

103

ET AL.

supra note 8, at 203 (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(d)).

